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CASE NOTES 
Civil Rights-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT-TITLE 
VII oF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT REQUIRES REASONABLE AccoMMODA-
TION OF EMPLOYEE RELIGIOUS BELIEF BY EMPLOYER DESPITE CoN-
FLICTING LAWFUL AGENCY SHOP PROVISION-Cooper v. General 
Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub 
nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 
3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537). 
In 1972, General Dynamics and the International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Local No. 776 
(the union), incorporated an agency shop provision into their 
collective bargaining agreement.• Plaintiff employees, all 
Seventh-day Adventists, objected on religious grounds to there-
quirement of financially supporting the union. 2 Under threat of 
discharge for their refusal to pay union dues, they brought an 
action against their employer and the union for injunctive relief. 
Plaintiffs contended that General Dynamics and the union had 
discriminated against them because of their religion in violation 
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII).3 The defen-
dants took the position that the agency shop provision contained 
in the collective bargaining agreement was authorized under the 
1. An "agency shop" is a union security agreement that does not obligate an em-
ployee to become a member of a labor union or to participate in any union activities but 
only requires that he .pay an agency fee, usually the equivalent of union dues, in return 
for the collective bargaining services that the union renders on behalf of the employees. 
Cooper v. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d 163 
(5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537). "Union shops" and "closed 
shops" are other types of union security agreements. 
2. 378 F. Supp. at 1260. The Seventh-day Adventists, while in sympathy with the 
basic goals of organized labor, such as proper wages, proper hours, and proper working 
conditions, place great value upon personal liberty of conscience, believing that no person 
could enjoy or exercise freedom of conscience when bound to membership in any labor 
union involving men of various convictions being associated together and mutually re-
quired to adhere to policies, comply with decisions, and abide by restrictions that may 
be contrary to individual conscience. It is well known that occasions arise when, failing 
to obtain these objectives through the peaceful processes of negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration, measures of coercion are restored to, taking the form of boycotts, strikes, 
picketings, and similar methods of enforcing their demands. Being under the scriptural 
injunction as Christians that "the servant of the Lord must not strive," and that he is to 
"do violence to no man," Seventh-day Adventists believe sincerely they must stand apart 
from a relationship that requires participation in such procedures. Gray v. Gulf, M. & 
O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 4 and therefore could be 
lawfully enforced notwithstanding the plaintiffs' religious be-
liefs.5 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas entered judgment for the defendants, finding that al-
though plaintiffs were sincere in their religious convictions and 
committed to their church's opposition to membership in, or sup-
port of, labor unions, such beliefs were "specious." In the court's 
view, there was "no conflict between the plaintiffs' religious be-
liefs and the union security agreement. "8 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the lower court and found that plaintiffs' beliefs were 
protected under section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the plain-
tiffs' religious beliefs could be reasonably accommodated by the 
employer and the union without undue hardship to either.8 
l. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Conflict 
The conflict between the free exercise of religion and labor's 
right to organize and establish union security provisions origi-
nated soon after Congress amended the Railway Labor Act in 
1951.9 The constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act provision 
that authorized union shops10 was quickly challenged 11 in Otten 
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). 
5. Brief for Appellees, Machinists District Lodge 776 at 9-29; Brief for Appellee, 
General Dynamics at 4-5. 
6. 378 F. Supp. at 1262. 
7. 533 F .2d at 167-69. "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance 
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). 
8. 533 F.2d at 165. 
9. Pub. L. No. 914, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951). 
10. The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, ... any carrier or carriers 
... and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and author-
ized to represent employees . . . shall be permitted~ 
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employ-
ment, that ... all employees shall become members of the labor organization 
representing their craft or class . . . . 
(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or 
carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment 
to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, or 
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v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 12 where a railroad employee 
brought an action to enjoin the railroad from discharging him on 
grounds of his refusal to join the union because of his religious 
beliefs. 13 Affirming the denial of injunction relief, Judge Learned 
Hand, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, recognized that conflict between religious princi-
ples and labor policies was inevitable. Although not explicit in 
the opinion, it appears that Judge Hand found that giving unions 
additional bargaining power by means of the union shop out-
weighed the need to protect plaintiff's conscientious "idio-
syncrasies.''14 
The Supreme Court later reiterated the validity of the Rail-
way Labor Act's union shop provision in Railway Employee's 
Department AFL v. Hanson. 15 There, the Court recognized that 
the aim of the legislation requiring uniform union membership 
was to enhance peaceful labor relations and to require a fair shar-
ing of the costs of collective bargaining by those who benefited 
therefrom. 16 In balancing the burden upon dissenting employees' 
constitutional rights of freedom of association and due process 
against the benefits accruing through the union shop, the Court 
stated that "[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce" 
justified the legislation. 17 
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 18 how-
ever, the Supreme Court took a significant step toward recog-
nizing individual employee rights by holding that the provision 
of the Railway Labor Act making payment of union dues and 
any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments ... uniformly required as a 
condition of acquiring or retaining membership ... . 
Railway Labor Act § 2 Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1970). 
11. See Note, The "Free Exercise" Clause of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution is No Defense to a Union Shop Agreement Allowed Under the Railway 
Labor Act, 8 Hous. L. REv. 387 (1970). 
12. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953). 
13. ld. 
14. Judge Hand stated: 
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government, though 
even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one the right to insist that 
in the pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his 
own religious necessities .... We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, reli-
gious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life .... 
ld. at 61 (footnote omitted); accord, Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956). 
15. 351 u.s. 225 (1956). 
16. ld. at 231; see 96 CONG. REc. 16,279 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Hill). 
17. 351 U.S. at 233. 
18. 367 u.s. 740 (1961). 
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fees mandatory was not absolute. Street, a union member, 
brought an action in Georgia state court alleging that the money 
he was compelled to pay to the union in order to retain his job 
was being used in substantial part to finance the political cam-
paigns of candidates whom he opposed for federal and state off-
ices and "to promote the propagation of political and economic 
doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which he disagreed."19 
The Supreme Court found that the mandatory union dues and 
fees provision of the Railway Labor Act did not authorize the 
union to make such use of the funds exacted from employees. 20 
While the Court upheld the mandatory dues requirement, it pro-
hibited the union from spending an employee's involuntary con-
tributions for political causes that he opposed. 21 
Subsequent cases of alleged religious discrimination22 gener-
ally followed the Supreme Court's holding in Hanson23 that the 
requirement of financial support of the collective bargaining 
agency by all who received the benefits was within the power of 
Congress and did not violate the first amendment. 24 In Sherbert 
v. Verner, 25 however, the Supreme Court determined that in in-
stances of first amendment infringement only a compelling state 
interest could justify an "incidental burden" on the free exercise 
of religion.26 The Sabbatarian appellant in Sherbert, after having 
been discharged for her refusal to work on Saturdays and having 
rejected other jobs requiring Saturday work, was deemed ineligi-
ble for unemployment compensation by the South Carolina Em-
ployment Security Commission because she failed to accept 
"suitable work when offered."27 The Court found that the appel-
lant's ineligibility for benefits stemmed directly from the practice 
of her religion and that she was forced "to choose between follow-
ing the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order 
to accept work, on the other hand."28 Finding an absence of any 
compelling state interest to justify such a choice, the Court held 
19. ld. at 744. 
20. ld. at 768-70. 
21. ld. 
22. See, e.g., Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
u.s. 872 (1971). 
23. 351 u.s. 225 (1956). 
24. ld. at 238. 
25. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
26. ld. at 403. 
27. I d. at 399-401. 
28. ld. at 404. 
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the infringement of her first amendment right to the free exercise 
of religion to be unlawful. 29 
B. The Conflict Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In an effort to eliminate discrimination in employment, Con-
gress enacted title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30 Title Vll, 
along with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission31 
(EEOC) Regulations issued in 1966 and 1967 requiring an em-
ployer to make a reasonable effort to accomodate his employees' 
religious beliefs, 32 evidenced increased governmental concern for 
individual employee rights. In contrast, congressional authoriza-
tion of the union shop in the private employment sector, as evi-
denced in the NLRA, 33 exhibited strong congressional support for 
the principle of solidarity among union members.34 Cases involv-
ing conflicting religious and labor interests brought after passage 
of the EEOC Regulations and the NLRA failed to resolve the 
29. !d. at 406-10. The Court stated that "in this highly sensitive constitutional area, 
'[ o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible 
limitation."' Id. at 406 (footnote omitted). 
30. Ch. 352, tit. Vll, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
31. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was created by the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) to deal with problems of discrimi-
nation in employment and to assist in enforcement of the provisions of title Vll. Title Vll 
gives one the opportunity to obtain a legal resolution ofhis rights when the requirements 
of his religion conflict with those of his job. 42 U.S. C.§§ 2000e-2, -5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
alia: 
32. The 1967 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion provide, inter 
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds, required by section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes 
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accomodations to 
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accom-
modations can be made ~thout undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the em-
ployee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially 
similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. 
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to 
hire and employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer 
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accomo-
dations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable. 
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975). Confusion about the scope of the accomodation requirement 
exists in part due to the apparent limitation to Sabbath work situations. Indeed, the title 
of the regulation section is "Observance of the Sabbath and other religious holidays." I d. 
33. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1970). 
34. The union shop provision of the NLRA provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, or 
in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an 
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment 
membership therein . . ." Id. 
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conflict satisfactorily and resulted primarily in increased confu-
sion. 
In Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 35 for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit balanced the govern-
mental interest in requiring a fair sharing of collective bargaining 
expenses against plaintiff's religious beliefs, upon which his re-
fusal to pay union initiation fees and dues was based, 38 and deter-
mined that plaintiff's religious beliefs had to yield to the congres-
sionally approved concept of the union shop. 37 The court's cursory 
treatment of plaintiff's arguments, however, resulted in a judg~ 
ment based on the bare conclusion that the individual's interest 
seemed "less substantial" than the union's interest.38 
Subsequent religious discrimination cases based on alleged 
violations of the first amendment have failed to resolve the con-
flict, since the courts have generally refused to consider the 
EEOC regulations that required the employer to make efforts to 
accommodate an employee's religious beliefs.39 The refusal of the 
courts to apply EEOC regulations may have been a result of 
Railway Labor Act decisions almost unanimously considering 
union interests to outweigh whatever restrictions were placed on 
religious beliefs. 40 
Two federal district court decisions, however, have departed 
from the general trend of ignoring the EEOC accommodation 
requirement. In Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc. 41 and Dewey 
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 42 the courts applied the EEOC accommo-
dation regulations and found that the plaintiffs in each instance 
had been subjected to unlawful discharge because of their 
religious beliefs. 
35. 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). 
36. ld. at 17. 
37. ld. at 18. The panel stated: "[l]n weighing the burden which falls upon the 
plaintiff if she would avoid offending her religious convictions, as against the affront which 
sustaining her position would offer to the Congressionally supported principal of the union 
shop, it is plaintiff who must suffer." ld. 
38. ld.; see 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 291, 297-98 (1972). 
39. See, e.g., Hammond v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers Union, 462 F.2d 174 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972); Gray v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Comment, The "Free Exercise" Clause 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitition is No Defense to a Union Shop 
Agreement Allowed Under the Railway Labor Act, 8 Hous. L. REv. 387 (1970); Comment, 
Religious Observances and Discrimination in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1019, 
1030 (1971). 
40. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra. 
41. 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969). 
42. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), a{f'd by 
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
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C. Effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
In 1972 Congress officially enacted the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act (EEOA) 43 in an effort to strengthen the antidis-
crimination provisions of title Vll. 44 While the House of Repre-
sentatives did not raise the matter of religious discrimination, the 
Senate offered two amendments, 45 one of which was West Virginia 
Senator Jennings Randolph's definition of religion.46 Although 
the Senator proposed his amendment to protect Sabbatarian 
employees who had been discharged for their refusal to work on 
Saturdays, the broad language of the amendment suggests that 
Senator Randolph may have intended the application to cover 
other religious beliefs.47 Following the Senator's remarks, he in-
cluded in the record the texts of two federal court decisions. 48 
Each decision rejected a Sabbatarian plaintiff's claim that the 
employer was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because 
the employer had failed to accommodate the plaintiff's religious 
practice. Both courts also rejected the 1967 EEOC regulations 
requiring an employer to accommodate employees' religious 
beliefs. 49 The courts argued that Congress did not intend that 
reasonable accommodations be required, and therefore failure to 
do so was not contrary to the Act. 50 It is clear that Senator Ran-
43. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
44. Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 824-25 (1972). 
45. Id. at 858-61. 
46. Senator Randolph offered the following as an amendment to the EEOA: "The 
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an em-
ployee's or propective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer's.business." 118 CoNG. REc. 705-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. 
Randolph). The amendment is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). 
47. 118 CoNa. R.Ec. 705-06 (1972). 
48. Id. at 706-14. The cases to which Senator Randolph referred were Dewey v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 
689 (1971), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 
1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
49. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 328-31 (6th Cir. 1970), alf'd by an 
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 588-
89 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
50. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally 
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 
1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable 
Accomodations Requirement a Law "Respecting an Establishment of Religion"?, 51 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 485-86 (1976). 
The Randolph amendment's reasonable accomodation requirement has been chal-
lenged as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment with disparate 
results. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cummins v. Parker 
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dolph proposed his amendment precisely to show that Congress 
intended to place on employers the responsibility of accommodat-
ing employee religious beliefs.51 
The passage of the amendment had a marked effect upon the 
courts. For instance, in Riley v. Bendix Corp., 52 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 1972 amend-
ment fully validated the 1967 EEOC regulations, and since the 
defendant employer had not demonstrated inability to accommo-
date Riley's religious practice without undue hardship to his busi-
ness, Riley's discharge was unlawful under title Vll.53 
In subsequent cases the decisions generally centered on the 
scope of the accommodation requirement and the interpretation 
of what consituted undue hardship to the employer's business. In 
many cases the courts found that there had been little or no effort 
made to accommodate the employees' religious beliefs and prac-
tices. 54 Some courts focused on whether a transfer to another job 
was reasonable accommodation. 55 Others found that to require 
accommodation would have caused undue hardship to the 
employer's business. 58 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), found 
that the amendment had a valid secular purpose and that its effect was to inhibit discrimi-
nation, not advance religion. /d. at 553. On the other hand, the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California recently held that the amendment was a "law 
respecting the establishment of religion" and therefore invalid under the first amendment. 
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 2367 (Feb. 8, 1977). 
51. See Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable Accomodations Requirement a Law 
"Respecting an Establishment of Religion"?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 485-86 (1976). 
52. 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
53. Id. at 1116-18. 
54. See, e.g., Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt. 
1974); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 
1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 335 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973); Liberty 
Trucking Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 10 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. 6258 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 1975). 
55. See, e.g., Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1976); Dixon 
v. Omaha Pub. PowerDist., 385 F. Supp.1382 (D. Neb.1974); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum 
Steel Corp., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5332 (W.D. Pa. July 1, 1975); Drum v. Ware, 7 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. 7161 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 1974). 
56. "Undue hardship" has been found primarily in two categories of cases: (1) where 
an employer has a small number of employees, making scheduling changes impossible; 
e.g., Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 128 
(5th Cir. 1974); and (2) in job situations characterized as unique. E.g., Dixon v. Omaha 
Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 
375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), 
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976); Kettel v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. 
Ark. 1972). See 62 VA. L. REv. 237 (1976). But see, Reid v. Memphis Publ. Co., 369 F. 
Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 
394 (1976); Scott v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5076 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 
1973). 
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Sixth Circuit, however, recently intimated that only "chaotic 
personnel problems" could constitute business hardship suffi-
cient to relieve an employer of his accommodation duty.57 
Despite the recent spate of cases that have begun to define 
the parameters of the accommodation requirement, uncertainty 
remains in instances where employers have claimed that a union 
contract would be violated by a requirement to accommodate the 
religious beliefs of employees. 58 Initially the EEOC admitted that 
discharging an employee for refusing to pay union dues was not 
prohibited under federal law even though the employee's conduct 
was based on sincerely held religious beliefs. 59 In a 197 4 decision, 
however, the EEOC reversed its position,60 which it clarified in a 
1975 report: 
An employer must make reasonable accommodations for em-
ployees whose religion may include observances, practices and 
beliefs, ... which differ from the employer's requirements con-
cerning standards, schedules, or other business-related employ-
ment conditions. . . . 
A contract between an employer and a union will not serve 
as a defense by the union to charges of unlawful discrimination. 
This is true whether the contract specifically provides for an 
unlawful practice or omits any procedure for processing 
grievances against an unlawful practice. If an employer . . . is 
required under law . . . to revise its union contract in order to 
comply with the law . . . then the union involved is expected 
to cooperate in the revision. 61 
It is thus clear that the EEOC does not recognize union-employer 
contractual agreements as valid defenses to a charge of religious 
discrimination brought under title VII. 
The United States' Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently addressed a situation where a plaintiff Seventh-day Ad-
ventist refused to join a union or to pay any dues or their equiva-
57. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir.1975), aff'd by an equally 
divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976). See 54 TEx. L. REv. 616 (1976). 
58. See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976); 
Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974); 
54 TEx. L. REV. 616, 621 (1976). 
59. See [1976] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 237. 
60. EEOC Dec. No. 74-107 (Apr. 2, 1974), [1974] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 6430. 
61. 81 LABOR LAW REPORT ~~ 215.2, 335 (1975), GUIDEBOOK TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
PRACTICES (1975) (emphasis added). 
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lent to the union because of his religious beliefs. 82 Although the 
court remanded the case for a determination of whether the em-
ployer and union could accommodate plaintiff's religious needs, 
it instructed the lower court that the employee's discrimination 
claim should fail if a "suggested accommodation would impose 
undue hardship on the Union or on the employer's business."83 
The court seemed to imply that if any proposed accomodation of 
the appellant's religious beliefs would work an undue hardship on 
the employer and the union, the employee could be fired. 84 
D. The Health Care Institution Act of 1974 
In 1974 Congress legislated an absolute exemption to the 
union security agreement provision of the NLRA. Employees of 
health care institutions who have bona fide religious objections 
to joining or financially supporting any labor organization may, 
in lieu of periodic dues and fees; pay equal sums to a nonreligious 
charitable. fund. 85 In this legislation Congress went beyond the 
Randolph amendment88 to provide an absolute exemption to 
union membership or support that is not subject to the undue 
hardship qualification of the amendment. 
It is clear that union security agreements can be valid and 
that first amendment rights may yield to such an agreement. 87 
However, the Supreme Court's admission in International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. Street68 that the union shop requirements 
62. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974). 
63. ld. at 403. 
64. ld.; see Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amend-
ment-A Perspective, 3 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 343-44 (1975). 
65. The health care institution exemption provides: 
Any employee of a health care institution who is a member of and adheres 
to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body, 
or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or finan-
cially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join or financially 
support any labor organizations as a condition of employment; except that such 
an employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay 
sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund 
. . . chosen by such an employee from a list of at least three such funds, desig-
nated in a contract between such institution and a labor organization, or if the 
contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund chosen by the 
employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). 
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). See notes 
43-47 and accompany text supra. 
67. See notes 9-38 and accompanying text supra; [1976] 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 
~ 237. 
68. 367 u.s. 740 (1961). 
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are not absolutely protected and the subsequent legislation of the 
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and 
the Health Care Institution Act all evidence growing judicial and 
legislative concern for individual religious freedom in the employ-
ment sector. 
IT. INSTANT CASE 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
the instant case had to examine the scope of the civil rights legis-
lation to determine if relief from the union shop provision was 
appropriate. The prime issue was whether the Randolph amend-
ment, section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act, 89 exempted the plain-
tiffs from the union financial support requirement within the 
agency shop agreement. 
In reversing the lower court's decision for the defendants, 70 
the court initially recognized that it was error for the district 
court to have evaluated the logic or validity of appellants' reli-
gious beliefs or practices.71 Judges Gee and Brown rejected the 
arguments for a narrow interpretation of the statute requiring 
accommodation of religious beliefs. They looked to the express 
language of the provision and found that "all forms and aspects 
of religion, however eccentric, 72 are protected except those that 
cannot be, in practice and with honest effort, reconciled with a 
businesslike operation."73 The court reviewed the history of the 
provisions74 and regulations75 barring religious discrimination in 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). See notes 43-47 and accompanying text 
supra. 
70. Cooperv. General Dynamics, 378 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 533 F.2d 
163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. 
Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537). 
71. 533 F .2d at 166 n.4. Courts are not free to evaluate the logic or validity of religious 
beliefs. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965). 
72. This language may well represent the kind of judicial overzealousness that has 
been criticized. E.g., 54 TEx. L. REv. 616, 616 (1976). 
73. 533 F.2d at 168-69. 
74. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in pertinent part: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's . . . reli-
gion ... ; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's ... religion .... 
(b) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse 
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employment and concluded that the broad language of the Ran-
dolph amendment resulted in a duty of accommodation. 
The union argued that section 701(j) on its face only applied 
to employers. Further, it was intended to apply only to Sabbath 
worship, and could not be viewed as an exemption to the union 
shop provision under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, due to that 
section's "supremacy" clause: 
Nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United 
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement 
with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of 
employment membership therein . . . . 78 
The union also argued that when Congress intended to provide 
such an exemption, it did so by a narrow amendment to the 
NLRA itself-the health care institution exemption.77 
The majority examined the proviso of section 8(a)(3) and 
determined that it was not a "supremacy" clause, as argued by 
the union, but rather was intended to function within the NLRA 
itself. 78 The majority viewed Congress' recent passage of the 
to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of 
his . . . religion . . . or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of 
his . . . religion . . . . 
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization (1) ... to 
discriminate against any individual because of his . . . religion . . . (2) to limit, segregate, 
or classify its membership, or applicants for membership or to classify or fail or refuse to 
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's . . . religion . . . or (3) to cause or attempt to cause 
an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
75. The EEOC Religious Discrimination Guidelines provide in pertinent part: 
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds, required by § 703(a)(l) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an 
obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to 
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accom-
modations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business .... 
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to 
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer 
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accom-
modations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable. 
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975). 
76. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). 
77. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. 
78. 533 F.2d at 169. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act gives employees 
the right to engage in concerted activity or to refrain from engaging in such activity, except 
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health care institution exemption, 79 without undertaking to 
amend section 8(a)(3} as a condition precedent, as indicating 
that Congress did not intend for the proviso to be a true "supre-
macy" clause that "for all time lifts section 8(a)(3) above the 
general level of the United States Code to a position comparable 
to the Constitution .... "80 
The panel differed, however, as to the scope of the accommo-
dation duty and whether the duty should be placed on the union 
as well as the employer.81 Judge Brown, in a special concurrng 
opinion, joined with Judge Rives in holding that upon remand the 
lower court had to determine whether the union as well as the 
employer was faced with undue hardship by virture of the accom-
modation requirement.82 
While agreeing with Judge Brown on the undue hardship 
issue, Judge Rives dissented from the majority's extension of the 
accommodation duty to include an exemption from paying union 
dues under the agency shop agreement. He opined that the legis-
lative history of the Randolph amendment83 did not evidence any 
intention of amending the union shop provision to exempt 
employees with religious objections from joining a labor organiza-
tion or paying a dues equivalence. Since Congress had repeatedly 
rejected efforts to provide exceptions to the union security provi-
sion for employees with conflicting religious convictions, 84 and yet 
unanimously approved section 701 (j) as an amendment to the 
"to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in 
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)." The 
proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA carves out an exception to section 8(a)(1), (2), 
and (3) of the NLRA by allowing an employer and a union to contract to discriminate in 
regard to union activity and terms and conditions of employment. Without the proviso to 
section 8(a)(3), a union security provision in a collective bargaining agreement would, 
on its face, violate section 8(a)(1) by interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees; 
would violate section 8(a)(2) prohibiting an employer from "contributing financial or 
other support" to a union; and would violate section 8(a)(3) because it is discrimination 
in regard to the "tenure of employment." Without the proviso the union would be restrain-
ing or coercing employees in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) and would also be causing 
an employer to discriminate in violation of section 8(b)(2). Brief for Appellants at 18-19. 
79. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). 
80. 533 F.2d at 169. 
81. Judge Gee argued that the literal language of the statute required only employers 
to accommodate the reasonable religious beliefs of employees unless undue hardship was 
proved. Judges Brown and Rives, however, formed a majority on this issue and determined 
that upon remand, the union should be included with the employer in resolving the undue 
hardship and accommodation issues. Id. at 170-71, 175. 
82. Id. 
83. 118 CONG. REC. 705-731 (1972). 
84. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 400 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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1964 Civil Rights Act, 85 the dissent reasoned that Congress could 
not have intended for that section to apply to a refusal on reli-
gious grounds to support labor unions.86Judge Rives agreed with 
the union that when Congress extended coverage of the NLRA to 
employees of nonprofit hospitals, an express provision amending 
section 8(a)(3) was adopted.87 He reasoned that if the 1972 
amendment to title VIJ88 required employers to accommodate 
employees' religious convictions against labor unions in all cir-
cumstances, there was no need for Congress to have provided the 
exemption within the Health Care Institution Act of 1974. Under 
this reasoning, since Congress expressly passed the exemption, it 
must not have believed that title VII already provided a possible 
exemption to the agency shop provision of the NLRA for religious 
beliefs.89 
ill. ANALYSIS 
The principal conflict between the majority and dissent in 
the instant case was whether the broad language of the Randolph 
amendment protected appellants' refusal to support the union 
financially when the refusal was based on religious gounds. 90 In 
attempting to resolve the conflict, the majority and dissent ad-
dressed several issues: the congressional intent of the Randolph 
amendment; the significance of the proviso to section 8(a)(3) of 
the NLRA; and the impact of the health care institution exemp-
tion on section 8(a)(3). Analysis of the treatment of these 
arguments suggests that the majority reached a correct resolu-
tion. 
A. Congressional Intent of the Randolph Amendment 
Although Judge Rives' dissent was based on the thesis that 
Congress did not intend for section 701(j) to exempt employees 
with opposing religious beliefs from union support, the legislative 
history of the Randolph amendment yields little insight into what 
Congress intended as the scope of the act. 91 While Congress had 
85. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 731 (1972). 
86. 533 F.2d at 175-77. 
87. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. 
88. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). 
89. 533 F.2d at 176. 
90. ld. 
91. The legislative history reveals only that Senator Randolph intended for the 
amendment to at least protect Sabbatarian employees from being discharged for their 
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repeatedly rejected efforts to provide exceptions to union support 
in order to accommodate religious principles, 92 it unanimously 
approved the Randolph amendment, which stated that an effort 
had to be made to accommodate employees' religious beliefs and 
that all forms of religious beliefs, practices, and observances were 
protected.93 
In light of such attitudes, it is apparent that Congress did not 
foresee the potential conflict between the amendment and union 
security agreements. Judge Rives was correct in stating that the 
legislative history of the amendment does not evidence any indi-
cation of amending the union shop provision of the NLRA to 
exempt employees with conflicting religious beliefs. Such a con-
clusion stems naturally from the fact that Congress was not con-
sidering the amendment's application to the NLRA union shop 
provision. The legislative history only reveals that the amend-
ment was meant to require employers to accommodate employ-
ees' religious beliefs and practices, at least as they related to 
Sabbath observance. There is no indication that Congress consid-
ered refusals for religious reasons to pay union dues. The abbrevi-
ated legislative history does not preclude the possibility that Sen-
ator Randolph and others may have intended for the amendment 
to protect religious beliefs and practices beyond Sabbath wor-
ship. Several reasons support the application of the statute to 
religious practices other than Sabbath worship. Certainly the 
language of the amendment is broad enough to include such be-
liefs and practices. 94 In addition, there does not appear to be any 
valid reason for courts to protect only Sabbatarianism and not 
protect other beliefs that are equally important to an individual's 
free exercise of religion.95 Finally, when faced with infringements 
of first amendment religious beliefs and practices, courts ought 
to extend protection-especially where the statutory language is 
broad enough to do so. 
refusal to work on Saturdays. 118 CONG. R.Ec. 705-31 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). 
The only other indication of congressional intent is within the broad language of the 
amendment itself, protecting "all aspects of religious observances and practice, as well 
as belief .... ~·Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). 
92. See Note 84 and accompanying text supra. 
93. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). 
94. The language of the amendment expressly states that "The term 'religion' in-
cludes all aspects of religious observances and practice, as well as belief .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(j) (Supp. V 1975). The amendment was unanimously approved. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 
731 (1972). 
95. See note 2 supra. 
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B. Effect of the Health Care Institution Act of 1974 
Judges Gee and Brown properly found that the proviso to 
section 8(a)(3) was not a "supremacy" clause but instead served 
a necessary function within the NLRA itself. Indeed, a close ex-
amination reveals that without the proviso to section 8(a)(3), a 
union security provision in a collective bargaining agreement 
would, on its face, violate at least six other sections of the 
NLRA.96 
The majority and dissent differed on whether or not Congress 
specifically amended section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by enacting 
the health care institution exemption.97 When Congress extended 
coverage of the NLRA to employees of nonprofit hospitals, it is 
clear, as the dissent points out, that the NLRA was amended.98 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Rives reasoned that the health 
care institution exception to the NLRA was superfluous if the 
Randolph amendment already required an accommodation of an 
employee's religious convictions opposing union support. Since 
the exemption was passed, the dissent argued, Congress must not 
have believed that an exemtption already existed under title Vll. 
Such a conclusion, however, does not follow as logically as 
Judge Rives suggests. The accommodation requirement under 
title VII is not absolute but rather may be avoided if an employer 
or union99 is able to prove that the accommodation causes undue 
hardship on the conduct of the business. In contrast, the exemp-
tion passed by Congress for employees of nonprofit hospitals is 
absolute. Regardless of whether undue hardship on the conduct 
of the business is shown, the employees may not be forced to join 
or financially support the union. The fact that Congress did not 
mention the 1972 Randolph amendment follows logically from the 
realization that Congress was not interested in a qualified exemp-
tion but rather in an absolute one. Of importance is the fact that 
the reason Congress was interested in such a blanket exemption 
from union support was "to protect the beliefs of Seventh Day 
Adventists operating forty-seven hospitals and nursing homes 
96. See note 78 supra. 
97. 533 F .2d at 169, 176. 
98. 533 F .2d at 176. The NLRA was amended by the Health Care Institution Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 3, 88 Stat. 395-97 (1974). 
99. Although the amendment on its face only requires the employer to accommodate 
his employees' religious beliefs and practices, courts both in Yott v. North Am. Rockwell 
Corp., 501 F .2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974), and in the instant case have included the union 
with the employer in the determination of the accommodation and undue hardship 
issues. 
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across the country."100 In view of congressional concern mani-
fested for the religious principles of a large group, it is not unrea-
sonable to infer a similar concern, on a qualified basis, for indi-
viduals such as the appellants in the instant case. 
C. Mandatory Dues and Undue Hardship 
It is understandable that unions generally are not pleased 
with exceptions to their membership requirements; such excep-
tions may weaken their bargaining position. On the other hand, 
religious freedom is expressly protected by the first amendment. 
In Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 101 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the union 
and employer had a duty to accommodate the appellant's 
religious opposition to union financial support. 102 The court inti-
mated, however, that allowing the plaintiff not to pay union dues 
would meet the test of undue hardship.103 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision merely paid lip service to the accommodation re-
quirement. The court essentially determined that a de minimus 
inconvenience to a union and employer outweighed an individ-
ual's bona fide religious beliefs. 
The appellants in the instant case placed a union dues equiv-
alence in trust to be given to a nonreligious charity. 104 This ar-
rangement is similar to that required by Congress under the 
health care institution exemption. 105 Other employers and unions 
have similarly permitted employees whose religious objections 
barred their payment of money to a union to pay an equivalent 
amount to a charitable organization. 106 In fact, the AFL-CIO offi-
cially recommended such a policy to its unions and affiliates in 
1965.107 Under such an arrangement, appellants do not get a "free 
100. Brief for Appellants at 28 (quoting Daily Labor Report No. 106 of the Bureau of 
National Affairs (May 31, 1974)). 
101. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974). 
102. Id. 
103. ld. at 403. 
104. Brief for Appellants at 7, 8. 
105. Health Care Institution Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V 1975). 
106. BrieHor Appellants at 27; see Comment, Religious Observances and Discrimina-
tion in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1019, 1042-43 (1971). 
107. The AFL-CIO urged its union and affiliates to: "(1) Immediately adopt proce-
dures for respecting sincere personal religious convictions as to union membership and 
activities; and (2) Undertake to insure that this policy is fully and sympathetically imple-
mented by all local unions." Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council On Union 
Membership and Religious Objections, Sept. 20, 1965 (quoted in Brief for Appellants at 
23). 
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ride," and certainly no other employee would be tempted to use 
claimed religious objections to mask any desire to avoid payment 
of dues and fees to the union. In light of congressional approval 
of such a program in the health care institution exemption, and 
union and judicial approval in other areas, it does not appear that 
such an arrangement would work an undue hardship on the em-
ployer or union. 
There can be no question that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and the Health 
Care Institution Act of 197 4 all evidence increasing concern for 
individual religious rights in the employment field. The health 
care institution exemption especially has extensive ramifications 
for future instances of refusals for religious reasons to support 
unions. It represents a sensible compromise between the strong 
policies supporting both union security provisions and religious 
freedom. In light of this legislation, the court's application of the 
Randolph amendment to safeguard appellants' religious beliefs in 
the instant case is a reasonable extension of congressionally ap-
proved protection. 
